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The Role of Emotions, Reasons, and Intuition in Moral Judgement Essay Example
- Category:Psychology
- Document type:Essay
- Level:Undergraduate
- Page:2
- Words:1269
Based on the first hypothesis (1), the involved premise is supported with the existing positive correlation between DP and MFQ_J_PURITY. Due to such correlation, there result seems to be consistent with observations highlighted in the research undertaken by Wheatley and Haidt (2005). In addition, the study by Horberge et al. (2009) also reiterates that the greater propensity for disgust is due to severe judgements within impure conduct. Such findings are in line with the tenets of the SIM which majorly focuses on primacy of various emotive factors that drive moral reactions of people (Haidt, 2001). However, Horberg et al. (2009) holds a different opinion that disgust that has evolved as a method to avoiding contact with various agents, toxic or infectious, tends to expand its scope with time into regulation of both social and moral behaviours. On the other hand, the second hypothesis (2) does not show any significant correlation between DP and MFQ_J_PURITY. Based on the study undertaken with Horberg et al. (2009), the hypothesis is correct citing that any point the conclusion was that DP affects the purity of the moral domain, there was neither harm nor care. Moreover, such stand means that there is significant correlation between DP and any of the trolley dilemmas which are likely to be less considering that disgust tendencies tend to alter the perception of harm which is the main component associated with the dilemmas (Glenn et al., 2010).
While considering the third hypothesis (3), there no significant correlation that exists between the utilitarian responses within the “switch” variant trolleys and DP. In such a case, a negative correlation is expected with the “switch” dilemma increasingly becoming more impersonal in the description. According to Greene et al. (2001), such correlation is only possible if the participants do not cause direct harm while arriving at their utilitarian decisions. In another research conducted by Greene et al. (2004), the researchers noted that utilitarian and deontological reasoning are subserved by the functional antagonism that exists between the areas of the brain. Moll & de Oliveira-Souza (2007) focused on the same issue and concluded that the noted lack of link could be alluded to convolution of more moral processing compared to that portrayed by the currently existing dichotomous models.
Consequently, there is a significant negative correlation that exists between the utilitarian responses associated with the “footbridge” and DP (Koenigs et al., 2007). This forms the basis for the fourth hypothesis (4). Such hypothesis means that people that tend to show greater propensity of disgust are more likely to adopt various deontological perceptions associated with the “footbridge” dilemma (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). This is only achievable if the act that aims to harm people are more confronting compared to those that influence their demise at a distance (Choe & Min, 2011). Nonetheless, the noted results suggest that people experiencing high levels of DP tend to differ in their responses to various cases associated with moral dilemmas (Greene & Haidt, 2002).
Based on the analysis of the four hypotheses, it could be tempting to conclude that the variations involved in emotional relevance relates directly to the severity of the deontological decisions and moral reactions of people (Bartels, 2008; Patil & Silani, 2014). However, in research, correlation has only been discussed based on the disgust propensity factors. There are several research undertaken on the topic, although researchers are yet to establish the existing link between the moral dilemmas and DP especially causality (Rozin et al., 1999; Inbar et al., 2009). Based on the findings of Horberg et al. (2009), the researchers found that disgust only has the ability to affect the purity domain but not harm nor care. Considering that there is no relationship between purity and any of the trolley dilemmas, most research have not been able to signification of correlation that exists in hypothesis (4). To understand and investigate such gap, it is important that researchers determine whether other propensities associated with emotions such as sadness and anger have the ability to predict the trends that occur in the human dilemma (Greene et al., 2008).
The perception of basic emotions like sad and happy are considered being human invariant; thus, they are detached to people’s experience. Recent studies have suggested that emotion play important role in influencing moral judgements and violation of some moral foundations tend to induce specific corresponding emotions (Greene, 2007; Piazza & Landy, 2013). Before the effective revolution that occurred in the 1990s, most psychologists considered rational method to various moral decisions that involved grounding moral knowledge and judgement on the controlled and cognitive processes associated with conscious reflection and reasoning (Chapman & Anderson, 2014). Based on the findings of this research, it is evident that there is negative correlation between DP and utilitarian responses which suggests that disgusts is mainly relevant during the formation of moral judgements in various dilemma cases.
Reference
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