System Engineering Principles




2Capability description


3Fundamental Inputs of Capability



3Collective training

4Major systems




5Command and Management



6Capability description


7Fundamental Inputs of Capability



7Collective training




9Command and Management

9Threat Detection


10Capability description


10Fundamental Inputs of Capability



11Collective training

12Major systems




13Command and Management



ADAV Air-Deployable Amphibious Vehicle

ADF Australian Defence Force

FIC Fundamental Inputs of Capabilities

Figure 1: Collective training landscape

Figure 2: Chain of command of ADF on operations

Figure 3: Organisation of systems



Several capabilities have been identified for the development of the Australian Defence Force. To that end, a new capability, which is the Air Deployable Amphibious Vehicle (ADAV) system, is necessary. The priorities of the ADF are in a better position to lead to the identification of key areas of emphasis. Such areas include the use of ADAV capability in defending Australia from incidences of coercion or direct attack. The introduction of Australia Defence Force’s new Air-Deployable Amphibious Vehicle (ADAV) as part of its capabilities presents a fundamental shift concerning the deployment of its land and air forces. Furthermore, this capability allow for the facilitation of operations within ADF as a way of responding to various spectra of future scenarios. Foster (215) observes that the army’s administration has a duty to foster the development an ADAV in order realise new capabilities in the army. Moreover, there is the need to develop the other capabilities of in the military system. The operating system for battle space represents a combination of collective training, personnel, supplies, major systems, command and control, facilities, support as well as organisation that are employed in the performance of a holistic system.

Capability description

According to Ball (152), there is an urgent need to come up with an Air-Deployable Amphibious Vehicle system to aid in the operations and activities of the Australian Defence forces. The Air-Deployable Amphibious Vehicle will have the ability to enhance mobility features through tactical techniques. The development of the needs that the ADAV intends to meet will play a critical role in ensuring that the ADF is able to function in appropriately in adverse conditions such as those with obstacles and unfavourable terrain. The ADAV capability will be expected to meet the following needs:

Movement in hostile conditions and various terrains will require the fulfilment of needs by the ADAV as follows:

  • Ensuring mobility in a wide range of terrain

  • Ensuring mobility in environments with obstacles

  • Ensuring that they are ADAV is deployable by the MRH90

  • Ensuring an increased effectiveness of mobility


The requirements for the Air-Deployable Amphibious Vehicle system will include the following design details (Australia Air Force 301):

  • Angles of inclinations between 35° and 65° for slope mobility

  • Endurance speed of a minimum of 65 km/h

  • Electronic system of control for mobility manipulation

  • An effective system of communication for the operators

Fundamental Inputs of Capability


The introduction of new capabilities for the ADAV is expected to will influence the personnel across the ADF. Furthermore, it will be necessary to review the entire workforce and other developments within the personnel management. In due course, there will be need for the development of a plan aimed at capability realisation that will provide information concerning the workforce as well as critical components of staff capability. Personnel areas that are considered include:

  • Maintainers taking part in various lines of support and influences brought about by information systems involved in predictive maintenance

  • The ADAV management team and staff

  • Civilian and military trainers

  • Improved and modernised plans as well as structural changes

  • Research on human factors and the understanding of the impacts associated with technological changes on system operation

  • Centralisation of support management


The presence of a maintenance schedule will ensure timely and effective examination of the system regularly. This level of maintenance will boost the operational concept of facilities within ADF and assist in preparing the army for battlegrounds. According to Sarker and Tapabrata (134), the organisation of army’s amphibious groups involves concerted efforts and contributions from medium artillery, armour, aviation, logistics and engineers.

Collective training

Collective training concerning the use, operation and management of the ADAV will contribute immensely to the maximisation of its capability. The Australian Defence force is expected to be in comfortable position to conduct collective training amongst its members. This trend will be progressive in its focus where the military forces will need accessibility to enhanced amphibious operations. The progressive nature of collective training on issues associated with the operation and maintenance of amphibian vehicle requires access to enhanced technology. This could include presentation of fleets of national training as well as those of operational contingency.

System Engineering Principles

Figure 1: Collective training landscape

Collective and individual trainings for amphibious related operations and tasks will require fundamental infantry skills such as the exposure to surface and maritime environment as indicated in the above figure. Glen (92) observes that warfare involving contemporary amphibious involves the utilisation of capabilities that are necessary in the operation of well docks, flight decks and a wide range of vehicles moving on platforms and through surf and within beaches. Collective training is needed to ensure a safe operation of the maritime environment and its efficient articulation by the ADF in order to present an amphibious force with trainings that are similar to the previous regimes. Survivability in different environments and terrains is a mandatory training for the various functions within the ADF including specialist military personnel who are attached marine vessels.

Major systems

There will be need to clear major infrastructural systems as well as securing effective means of communication in preparation for the smooth functioning of the ADAV capability. Rapid mobility will also be necessary in securing the required terrain to boost defensive manoeuvre. Such terrain will involve the inclusion of major road/ river crossing points and corridors used for making advancements in threat locations. Urban infrastructure, institutions and government facilities will be important to the terrain throughout the operation, and securing these will be support on going stability operations. The capability development group in relation to ADAV will have a role to play in its further development. The group will be expected to draw experimentation and supporting concepts from previous works and approved defence documents. The expeditionary system of the ADAV is obtained from bradley hull of Infantry Fighting Vehicle. Stowage boxes are also fixed on either side of the vehicle. The design of the rear section involves the inclusion of a trapdoor whose function is the ejection of empty cases of cartridge. A light version of aluminium armour is included to offer protection to the ADAV from which provides protection from shell splinters and fire from small arms. The design of this version is meant for deploying forces in a rapid manner with the capability to sustain airdropping of with weights of up to 17,000 Kg (Foster 187).


The improved system of the Air-Deployable Amphibious Vehicle will require the involvement of supplies that will allow it to function efficiently and effectively in a wide variety of terrains and environmental conditions. Further, the assurance appropriate supplies will facilitate the need for future replacements and adjustments. The major armament of the ADAV supplies contains a weapon elevation and a turret traverse, which operate on hydraulics. These components are also equipped with manual control systems that meant for emergency functions. The vehicle is also equipped with ammunition loaders that are automatic in nature. The capacity of the loader involves the ability to fire 12 rounds in one minute. The tank has a capacity of 30 rounds in total (Jane 243). There is also a machine gun mounted on side of the armament and another one fixed on the right side of the commander’s cupola.


Amphibious warfare has continued to play a critical role in the operations of the Australian military. Thus, the army would be expected to introduce a new Air-Deployable Amphibious Vehicle as one of its capabilities in dressing complex operations within its facilities and environment. Amphibious vehicle capabilities are vital to the success of Australian military operations and their absences possess several limitations to the strategic options available to the ADF.


Australia’s new Air-Deployable Amphibious Vehicle is expected to consist of strategic lifts with the ability to carry out deployment for battle groups with all the necessary equipment. Additionally, there will be additional landing crafts to facilitate the independent operation of the ADAV. In this case, the amphibian vehicle is expected to operate independently within the contingencies of lower order as required. The vehicle will ensure the provision of multi-spot decks with flight capabilities as well as large landing craft. In addition, there are various support and war vehicles.

Command and Management

Command and management is another important aspect of the fundamental inputs to capability that demonstrates the combination and application of arising synergies towards the achievement of a common operational goal. Command and management of the ADAV capability will facilitate the support joint fires, the control of joint battle space as well as the command from various points of operation without presenting any recourse to shore operations.



In the context of defence, capability refers to the ability or capacity required for the achievement of an operational effect. Operational effects may be described or defined in according to the production of operational effects. In the Defence context, capability is the capacity or ability to achieve an operational effect. Moreover, capability may be considered as the effects that are obtained from a system of interdependent and interlocking Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC). The ADF has various means through which can identify the present state and the requirements of defence capabilities. Such identification initiatives are important when it comes to acquisition of equipment and decision making process. The ADF administration outlines various capabilities that are prioritised in relation to strategic importance. Moreover, strategic capabilities present essential benefits, in line with environmental requirements, that are reliable for ADF operations (Sarker and Tapabrata 158).

Capability description


The design of the MRH90 military helicopter is expected to have the capability to fulfil the ADF staff requirement when it comes to maritime and land operations. Further, its design and specifications will aim at meeting international and national standards such as and conditions of icing performance. There is a need to deliver a capability that will present airmobile squadrons, support for special operations, maritime support squadron as well as training roles. The training capability should provide maritime and airmobile support to the Australian Defence Force from a wide range of environmental conditions.


The requirements basis for the MRH90 will involve the current military functionality and quality standards. The requirements will also be checked against multi-roles and staff requirements. The design basis requirements are expected to include:

  • Design in accordance with quality standards

  • Military airworthiness system

  • Operation from slope and unprepared landing surfaces

  • Resistance to interference from Electro Magnetism

  • Compatibility with electromagnetism and operation through an armed system

Fundamental Inputs of Capability


The kind of personnel that is expected to undertake operations and the daily running of functionality of this system will work at various different levels. The selection of such personnel will consider the required levels of professionalism and technical skills among other personal attributes. Effective personnel section also looks at teamwork and interpersonal abilities of the individuals to be selected. It will be necessary to place emphasis of the level of experience for in system operations when it comes to selecting the required personnel.


The organisation of the staffs and systems in place to ensure a smooth and efficient operation of the military helicopter will focus on systems of armament and crew membership. Further, the aspect of organisation will place emphasis on the design, operation and maintenance of systems and infrastructures that will facilitate the mobility and tactical manipulation of the military helicopter. All maintenances and operations associated with MRH90 will follow and procedurally organised schedule that will offer the required guidance in accordance with the acceptable standards (Glen 133).

Collective training

Collective training is expected to involve equipping the personnel and the entire staff members involved with the operation and maintenance of the military helicopter with the required knowledge and understanding. This kind of training plays an important role in equipping the operators and maintenance personnel with competent skills and knowledge. Requirements for the collective training sessions will include the basic understanding of the basic functionality of the military helicopter as well as more complex issues such as maintenance procedures and addressing emergencies among others.

Major systems

The major systems will involve a turbo engines power the landing gear and the multirole engine of the MRH90 helicopter. Each engine has the capacity to develop the highest power of 1,662 kW. The engines are involved in powering the main rotor with four blades, which are featured in the hub of the main. The anti-torque function is achieved through combining the main transmission with a high positioned tail rotor. The service-operating ceiling of the aircraft is 20,000 ft high. The helicopter will have the ability to go up at rate of 8 m/s with a flight speed of 300 km/h. The range of this aircraft capability is expected to be 800 km with an allowance for further increase where additional fuel tanks are available (Jasper, 173).

The aim of this capability in relation to fundamental inputs originates from a maritime helicopter project. Consequently, there will be significant levels involving marine adjustments, which were incorporated into the design of the aircraft. The MRH90 capability will be beneficial to the support roles and responsibilities of the maritime team within the ADF. Moreover, this aircraft operation will raise the focus on the amphibious vehicle that will then be placed on the military team through the introduction of ship transportation services for future amphibious. The MRH 90 employs the use of fly-by-wire technology that allows for the accessibility of full advantages associated with digital platforms. Further, there is an increased security and the capacity to perform military operations in challenging and difficult environments.

According to Foster (172), the MRH90 helicopter is a 10t class of NH90 version of Australian helicopters involved in multirole. The manufacture of this aircraft is expected to be conducted by a subsidiary of Euro copter. The services of the MRH90 in the operations and functions of the ADF will replace those of the traditional Sea King fleet and Black Hawk. The design consideration of the MRH90 involves its induction into a special support for operations within maritime as well as across the entire Australian Defence Force (ADF). This capability has squadrons that are responsible for the provision of maritime support and tactical mobility of air from amphibious ships and land vehicles. The helicopter has the ability to experience full interoperation with the Nato forces.


The supply and acquisition of this military helicopter will be done on different phases with regard to the need and urgency. Further, their supply will consider the availability of infrastructure for their use and personnel for their operation and maintenance. Other tools and equipment will be necessary for supply alongside the aircrafts. These will include things such as lubricants and oils among others. Additionally, the supply of its components will be significant in addressing repairs and emergency maintenance operations.


The facilities linked to the military helicopter MRH90 will present a reliable replacement to Black Hawk helicopters and enhance transportation within the ADF. Furthermore, this helicopter has the ability to manoeuvre and offer maritime and airmobile support as well as other special operations within the Australian Defence Force. The joint operations of the aircrafts by the Navy and Army are expected to contribute to the realisation of considerable efficiencies and effectiveness across the fundamental inputs to capability. Additionally, these design considerations will permit the achievement of enhanced flexibility through fundamental inputs to capability (Sarker and Tapabrat 164). The use of common platforms by the MRH90 and other aircrafts allows the Navy to focus on the realisation of their presence around the sea for extended periods.


The support plays a fundamental role administration, operations and decision-making, administration and operations. The achievement of enhanced situational awareness will be realised through a helmet mounted display and sight. There will also be a self-protection suite with an electronically integrated warfare system for the management of airborne missions. Jane (156) observes that management of airborne operations involves a multi-functional displays coupled with variable format data display. The main flexible cabin positioned on the rear side will offers seats for a maximum 20 occupants. Additionally, the presence of a rear ramp will ensures the provision of efficiency and security during entry and exit by the troops.

Command and Management

The command and management of this capability will follow technical and operational procedures as indicated in the figure below. Breen (152) indicates that the mission system enable an efficient management of flight planning, mission equipment and tactical communications during deployment of various. The system that controls fly-by-wire mechanism of the MRH90 improves manoeuvrability and lowers the workload availed to pilots. The operation of the helicopter involves an integration of diagnostic and monitoring systems. Additional components on the aircraft will involve forward infrared and weather radar.

System Engineering Principles 1

Figure 2: Chain of command of ADF on operations



Capability planning in relation to threat detection is among the requirements that support the Australian Defence Force to direct considerations to the manner in which capabilities can meet the security objectives. Timely threat detection ensures that capability investment remains a critical focus and that military operations are able to offer appropriate considerations. Such measures assist in directing the available capabilities in meeting emerging or new risks and threats. It also plays a critical role in highlighting areas where the capabilities of the ADF are interdependent.

Capability description


The ADF capability in threat detection involves an evaluation of its capability in managing threats through adaptive strategies, training as well as procedures and tactics whose focus is on the mitigation of effects of attacks. This capability should also ensure that devices and others forms of attacks are defeated before they happen. Threat detection capability is reliance on intelligence strategies to carry out investigations aimed at prior detection.


The requirements for the threat detection capability will be expected to achieve considerations, which include:

  • Keeping check with new technological developments

  • Identification of new vulnerabilities

  • Advising the ADF on ways of mitigating emerging threats

Fundamental Inputs of Capability


The levels of competency and academic qualifications for the personnel involved in the management of threat detections will be a major consideration. Such considerations will ensure that the necessary operations are carried out in effective and professional manner without errors and inefficiencies. Technological skills are also part of the necessary considerations in determining the appropriate individuals to be the personnel in the conditions that involve threat understanding and detection. The personnel taking part in the maintenance of threat detection devices and systems will be expected to be experienced in quality control and intelligence information gathering. The cabin is designed to offer sufficient space and capacity for accommodating up to 20 troop seats. The aircraft will have the ability to accommodate two pilots together with 20 troops who are fully equipped with combats (Fagoyinbo 107). The glass cockpit of the helicopter will house two seats that are crash-worthy for two pilots. It will also contain fittings of jump seats with the ability to be folded during a crash.


Organisation is critical in the execution of threat detection measures especially in military operations. This is because of the sensitivity and gravity of the process of threat detection in relation to matters of military security. To this end, the planning, execution and maintenance of threat detections systems with the Australian Defence Forces will require to be carried out with utmost efficiency. In this case, the organisation will involve a control and control structure as described in the figure below:

System Engineering Principles 2

Figure 3: Organisation of systems

The organisational concept will present the necessary framework in addressing potential threats to the ADF. Such threats could range from irregular and ad hoc forces to major power adversaries. Adversary forces could represent a collaboration of various actors who are likely to exist and function along the spectra of conflicts. Effective organisation by the ADF will counter the adaptability of enemy forces that could bring about potential threats. Furthermore, the necessary level of organisation by the ADF will require changes in their performance approach based on skills and experience. It is important for the force to understand that the most sophisticated adversary will have the ability to coordinate attacks and multi-dimensional campaign against them (Breen 198).

Collective training

A system of collective training for the process of threat detection and its requirements will involve the use of recommended programs and simulators in class activation. Further, there will be field-training activities, which will be performed in different conditions of environment and scenarios. Collective training will be an important aspect of Fundamental Inputs to Capability when addressing concerns of threat detection. This training plays a major role in allowing the defence to take advantage of upcoming or new areas of innovation and technology that have the ability to offer competitive advantages to Australian forces against their adversaries.

Major systems

The design and development of major systems threat detection capabilities involve the travelling by the military forces through routes that are lined with models, information, warnings and exemplars. Waters (269) suggests that models that are used in the development and description of threat detection capabilities play a critical role in the achievement of specific effect as well as the understanding of Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC). The building blocks and components that is necessary in determining specific capabilities such as threat detection among others is realised through the inclusion of fundamental inputs to capability.


The supply of threat detection kits and other information gathering materials will facilitate the staff operations and implementation of the directives and instructional obtained during training sessions. The ADF will be expected to order the supply of mechanisms that resonate with technological advancements and evolution. To that end, threat detection platforms and systems used by military forces will be subjected to incremental upgrades regularly. These increments can be facilitated through systems coordination as well as the Fundamental Inputs to Capability concept of supplies. Additionally, there will be the incorporation of acquisition and definition processes for the supply of main equipment with proven functionality and effectiveness in threat detection (Jane, 142).


The nature of facilities for future activities and operations by the ADF will require an outline of strategic policies as a way of addressing the issue of threat detection. Such strategies will be critical in possessing and enhancing capabilities associated with amphibious warfare. Moreover, the support and personal aspects of fundamental inputs to capability are expected to offer the necessary guidance concerning the military conduct that will be able to combat operations that will lead to threat detection. The ADF will be expected to have the ability to detect threats within a spectrum of wars and conflicts, but especially in environments that are categorised as uncertain environment. (Bishop and Ian (276) indicate that the strategies aimed at threat detection by the military forces in Australian should place their focus on irregular threats as well as other forces from the non-peer military groups. In environments with higher levels of threat, there are greater risks and complexities. Thus, the ADF should be in a good position to carry out missions that are adequately informed concerning the existence or possibility of threats. According to the observations made by Ball (143), threat detection capabilities could be understood in a simplistic manner through the development of complex strategies.


There will be need for the ADF to acquire effective support facilitated by an agile system of capability acquisition. This system will offer a strong framework for full exploitation of the available opportunities that involve favourable environments for the operations and rapid advances in technology. The systematic approach to threat detection by the ADF will put them in a better position to overcome new operational threats in a manner that is efficient, timely and responsive. The acquisition of agile capability is important when it comes to communication systems as well as information fielding. This is because the cycles that were previously used in acquisition have rendered most equipment redundant and obsolete.

Command and Management

The ADF’s command and management will make considerable investments in technology and innovation that is expected to ensure that the various functions of the defence maintain resilience in case of threats. Further, the management will be expected to take preventive measures in addressing the possibility of their adversaries engaging in disruptive innovations and technologies. The observation by Breen (129) indicates that military forces that are employed in environments with higher potentials of encountering threats will put a lot of emphasis in minimising the existing and potential threats against their forces. In case of threats that are direct and specific in nature, the ADF will be expected to employ hard capability approaches. According to Fagoyinbo (251), hard capability techniques and approaches involve the use of major systems and facilities in performing early detection and issuing warnings. An alternative measure that the will be appropriate for the ADF in involving major systems as a way of addressing threat detection, is the adoption of soft capability approach. The view by Foster (262) describes the approach involving soft capability as the one involving building of trust between the military troops and the local communities. The two approaches employed in addressing threat detection by the ADF are expected to create a positive impact in reducing the threats by different levels and time scales.


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